This is a representative implementation pattern for teams that need runtime authorization before money movement, sensitive account changes, or outbound communication.
The goal is not to let Stage0 execute financial actions. The goal is to place a clear authorization boundary between agent intent and the actual payout, data change, or external notification path.
Payout requests, refunds, or balance adjustments should not execute on model output alone.
Customer account edits often need role checks and a clear reason before any write path opens.
Even a correct internal action can become a real incident if an agent messages the wrong party too early.
Put Stage0 in front of payouts, account-update tools, and external notification handlers.
Pass `approval_status`, `approved_by`, `approved_at`, and `actor_role` in `context` for every high-risk request.
Treat `verdict` as the gate and keep the actual side effect behind your own service boundary.
Use the audit trail to see which cases are under-specified, over-permissive, or missing approval flow design.
{
"goal": "Release a manual payout and notify finance",
"tools": ["payments_api", "internal_db", "email"],
"side_effects": ["money movement", "external notification"],
"constraints": [
"approval required",
"required_role:risk_ops",
"allowed_environment:production",
"max_cost_usd:2"
],
"context": {
"actor_role": "risk_ops",
"approval_status": "approved",
"approved_by": "[email protected]",
"approved_at": "2026-03-14T09:30:00Z",
"environment": "production",
"run_id": "run_fintech_001"
},
"pro": true
}Your operators should be able to answer who approved the action, what policy version allowed it, which environment it targeted, and why the final runtime decided to continue.